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The value underlying privacy lies in the fact that it mirrors the very idea of human dignity 
and the protection of the personal realm. However operational requirements of employers and 
advancements in science and technology continuously challenge the notion of privacy in the 
workplace. Employees all over the world are victims of a number of privacy invasive 
measures including, but not limited to drug testing, background checks, HIV/AIDS testing 
and polygraph testing. Present day advancements in technology and science make the 
recognition and protection of the right to privacy even more urgent. The concept of privacy in 
the workplace has grown in importance as technology has enabled sophisticated forms of 
testing and monitoring of employees. As a result of these advancements a deep tension has 
arisen between two conflicting sets of principles. Consequently the rationale for this study is 
to strike a balance between the employee’s right to privacy and the employers right to 
conduct his or her business as he or she deems fit. This will be done through an analysis of a 
number of practices adopted by the employer in the workplace of which contribute to the 
infringement. Further the admissibility of such evidence procured by the employer through 
these practices will be interrogated. This is a significant issue as scientific and technological 
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Body searches, workstation searches and video surveillance in the workplace (40) 
























PRIVACY IN THE WORKPLACE: STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN THE 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF EMPLOYEES AND THE OPERATIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS OF EMPLOYERS 
 
BACKGROUND & STATEMENT OF PURPOSE: 
 
The value underlying privacy lies in the fact that it mirrors the very idea of human dignity 
and the protection of the inner sanctum. Despite such inherent value operational requirements 
of employers continuously challenge the notion of privacy in the workplace.  
 
The right to privacy is one of the fundamental rights contained in the Bill of Rights in section 
14 of the South African Constitution. This right extends and protects not only the right to 
physical privacy, but also the privacy of personal data which the employer may have access 
to by way of the employment relationship. Our courts have interpreted the application of 
section 14 as an important but not an absolute fundamental right. Hence this right has to be 
balanced with other rights. In particular an employee’s right to privacy must be balanced with 
the employer’s business necessity or operational requirements. 
 
Despite this constitutional protection, employees all over the world are victims of a number 
of privacy invasive measures including, but not limited to drug testing, background checks, 
HIV/Aids testing, polygraph testing and interception of email and internet communications. 
 
The purpose of this research is to determine to what extent privacy is protected in the 
workplace in light of the advancements in technology which enable easy access and 
monitoring of the communications of employees and the statutory and common law 
limitations of the right to privacy. 
 
RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY: 
 
The rationale for this study is to examine the impact of the law on the employee’s right to 
privacy and the employers right to conduct his or her business as he or she deems fit. This is a 
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significant issue as technological advancements in the employment sphere have a very 
tangible impact on the wellbeing of employees. 
 
It is hoped that this research can be of practical value and enable employers to establish 




It is apparent that even though the courts and legislators have an idea of what privacy is, they 
cannot adequately define it with some clarity. As a result of this uncertainty the concept of 
privacy remains difficult to define, resulting in much debate and confusion amongst critics. 
 
Thompson for example states that ‘perhaps the most striking thing about the right to privacy 
is that nobody seems to have any clear idea what privacy is’.
1
 Similarly Michael states that 





An interesting observation however, is that by Gross who claims that ‘it is not the function of 
the law to determine what privacy is.
3
 The function of the law, according to Gross, is to 
identify ‘situations of privacy that will be afforded legal protection or will be made private by 
virtue of legal protection’, because ‘privacy is a creature of life in a human community and 
not the contrivance of a legal system concerned with its protection’. This statement is ironical 
because if it not the function of the law to determine what privacy is, then whose function is 
it. 
 
McQuoid Mason provides some insight into the nature and significance of the right to privacy 
where he states that ‘it is recognised by social scientists as essential for the preservation of an 





                                                          
1
 Thompson ‘The Right to Privacy’ Philosophy and Public Affairs 1975 (2) 95. 
2
 Michael ‘Privacy and Human Rights: An International and Comparative Study, with Special Reference to 
Developments in Information Technology’ (1994). 
3
 Gross ‘The Concept of Privacy’ (1977) 42 New York University Law Review 36. 
4
 McQouid Mason ‘The Law of Privacy in South Africa’ (1978) 98. 
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On an evaluation of these different critics it seems difficult to identify or define a single 




Information will be gathered primarily from the case law and legislation. Literature in the 




The concept of privacy in the workplace will provide a framework for the study. Privacy will 
be seen as a constitutional right afforded to all human beings, but which can be legitimately 
limited in terms of the limitation clause in the Constitution. This limitation will be addressed 
in the employment sphere particularly, a sphere where many employees spend most of their 
lives.  
 
Privacy is considered as a basic human need, essential for the development and maintenance 
of a free society and for the preservation of the inner sanctum.
5
 McQuoid Mason comments 
that social scientists perceive the right to privacy as the right to have control over one’s 
“information preserve”, and to maintain a “a status of personal dignity”, while invasion of 
privacy is “an immoral affront to human dignity.”
6
 It is thus evident that the right to privacy 
is an important value in individuals as it preserves and maintains there autonomy and human 
dignity. It presents individuals with a choice to decide when and how much of their personal 
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6
 Note 4 above, 39. 
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LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF PRIVACY: 





“Everyone has the right to privacy, which shall include the right not to have; 
a) their person or home searched; 
b) their property searched; 
c) their possessions seized; or 
d) the privacy of their communications infringed”. 
It is important however to acknowledge that the right to privacy as enumerated in the 
Constitution is not an absolute right and as a result has to be balanced with other rights. “In 
particular, the employee’s right to privacy must be balanced with the employer’s business 
necessity or operational requirements”.
8
 Our courts have interpreted the application of section 
14 as an important but not an absolute fundamental right and hence in certain circumstances 
this right can be limited in terms of the Limitation clause provided for in terms of section 36 
of the Constitution.
9
  The section reads as follows: 
 
“(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including – 
 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, 
no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
                                                          
7
 Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1996 Constitution). 
8
 M McGregor ‘The Right To Privacy In The Workplace: General Case Law and Guidelines for Using The 
Internet and e-Mail’ Mercantile Law Journal 2004 638, 639. 
9
 Note 7 above, section 36. 
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From this it is evident that a right can only be limited if the limitation is authorized by “a 
law” and the law itself must be of general application.  Whether or not such limitation is 
justifiable depends on the criteria set out in subsections 36(1) (a)-(e). In interpreting this 
limitation clause it is interesting to note that the Constitutional Court stated that that “the 
protection accorded to the right of privacy is broad but it can also be limited in appropriate 
circumstances”
10
 and that the scope of a person’s privacy should extend only to those areas 
where he/she would have a legitimate expectation of privacy.
11
 This concept of legitimate 
expectation will be interrogated in my dissertation and further to what extent the privacy 




The right to privacy has also been given international recognition in various declarations. It is 
expressly guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
12
: 
Article 12 of the Declaration provides: 
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor attacks on honour or reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of law against such interference or attacks.
13
 
It is also fleshed out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
14
: 
Article 17 states that: 
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor attacks on honour or reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of law against such interference or attacks.
15
 
Aside from international protection, the right to privacy has also been given regional 
protection in the European Convention on Human Rights
16
: 
Article 8 of the ECHR provides that: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
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 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948. 
13
 Ibid, article 12. 
14
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
15
 Ibid, article 17. 
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2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 




Having explained the importance of the right to privacy and the protection that various legal 
instruments afford to it the question that arises, which is the heart of my dissertation, is to 
what extent is this right protected in a workplace environment where employees move away 
from their private sphere and into a public domain. This is a contentious issue and involves 
the balancing of two competing interests, on the one hand due consideration must be given to 
an employee’s right to privacy, as employees do not waive their privacy rights when entering 
into an employment relationship and on the other hand, “there is the right of the employer to 
enjoy its property and exercise its managerial powers of command to protect its property 
against abuse that might cause direct or indirect damage to the employer’s business”.
18
 In this 
regard striking a balance accordingly becomes important. 
 
The Constitutional Court has held that “privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, 
but as a person moves into communal relations and activities such as business and social 
interaction the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly”
19
Despite such “shrinkage” it 
would however be unreasonable to hold that an employee has no expectation whatsoever to 
privacy in the workplace. This is because although an employee might be under the “control” 
of the employer that control should not be exercised in a manner that infringes substantially 
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 Ibid, article 8. 
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Reinhard “Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: A Comparative Study: Part III: Recurring 
Questions of Comparative Law; Information Technology and Worker’s Privacy: Information 
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THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN 
THE WORKPLACE: 
 
A number of arguments have been made for and against the protection of privacy in the 
workplace. Firstly in dealing with the arguments for the protection of privacy many 
employees argue that the protection of the right to privacy in the workplace preserves their 
right to autonomy and as a result thereof any infringement would impact on their dignity, 
health and well being.
20
 Secondly employees argue that privacy breeds diversity and its 
protection not only works against conformist pressures, but also nurtures the development of 
fresh ideas, beliefs and attitudes.
21
 Thirdly employees feel that if they do not have privacy in 
the workplace they will feel that their employer does not trust them and as a result of this 
perceived lack of trust this might lower employee morale and erode the mutual respect 
between an employer and employee that needs to exist in order for a healthy and productive 
working relationship to continue.
22
 Lastly another reason which is quite important is that 
“employers provide employees with certain technologically advanced tools such as a 
telephone, voicemail, email, and Internet access, all of which allow employees to accomplish 
more work in less time. Employees contend that the increased productivity demands of the 
workplace, and increased demand on the amount of time that employees spend at work, 
require employees to mingle their personal and professional lives. This is especially so when 
it comes to such items as email usage. Employees need to take care of personal business in 
the office, and if the employee can most quickly resolve personal matters by using workplace 
resources, it is in the employer's best interest to allow the employee to do so. The only way 
for the employee to feel comfortable conducting their personal business at work is by 
ensuring that private business will remain private. In such an environment, where employees' 
handling of private matters results in a benefit to the employer in terms of higher morale, 
increased productivity, and more time spent at work, employees arguably should not be 
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 M S Hornung ‘Think Before You Type: A look at Email Privacy In The Workplace’ Fordham Journal of 
Corporate and Financial Law 115 2005-2006, 123. 
23 M Echols, Striking a Balance Between Employer Business Interests and Employee Privacy: Using 
Respondeat Superior to Justify the Monitoring of Web-Based, Personal Electronic Mail Accounts of Employees 
in the Workplace, Comparative Law Review & Technological Journal 273 2003, 279. 
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Turning to the arguments that are proposed against the protection of privacy in the 
workplace, firstly employers are concerned with work productivity and profitability and are 
of the opinion that employees are wasting time reading their own Email and making personal 
calls and other non-related work activity. As a result of this they are ‘eating into’ work time 
and the employers primary aim of productivity is being reduced. Secondly, employers are 
concerned with the improvement of economic conditions and hence wish to hire competent 
workers who are unlikely to cause workplace disruptions or be careless whether from 
absenteeism or ill health. This in turn justifies medical testing such as HIV/AIDS testing from 
the employer’s perspective.
24
 Lastly the most common reason proposed by employers is that 
“they have an established right to run their organisation in a method that will best protect 
their company” and hence the aspect of ‘managerial prerogative’ takes precedence over an 
employee’s right to privacy. From these reasons advanced by the employer it is evident that 
little, or no recognition is given for an employee’s right to privacy and the main focus is 




It is against this background that in my dissertation I will be identifying and analysing some 
of the practices adopted by the employer in the workplace and I will illustrate how these 
practices may infringe the privacy rights of employees.  
 
I will begin by analysing the development of the legal protection of privacy in South Africa 
and in the United States. This will be done on an analysis of the common law protection right 
up until Constitutional protection. The reason as to why I chose thee two different countries is 
because each country has a distinct approach towards privacy protection. On the one hand 
South Africa provides for and protects for and protects the right to privacy explicitly in 
section 14 of the Constitution which is also given effect in various other legislation which I 
will set out in forthcoming chapters, whereas the United States of America has no specific 
right to privacy in its Constitution but has instead found a way to protect privacy through 
other rights in its Constitution.  
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 Mimmy Gondwe The Protection of Privacy in the Workplace: A Comparative Study (published LLD thesis, 
University of Stellenbosch, 2011) 147. 
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Thereafter I will examine four distinct practices utilized by an employer in the workplace 
which raises concerns for the accommodation of privacy in the employment sphere.  These 
practices are polygraph testing, HIV/AIDS testing, body and desktop searches and lastly 
interception and monitoring of communications at the workplace.  
 
Importantly with regards to the chapter on the interception and monitoring of 
communications at the workplace I will be discussing the impact of the newly promulgated 
Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication- Related 
Information Act. 
25
This Act was specifically enacted to prohibit the interception of direct and 
indirect communications in the workplace and in essence to protect the privacy right of 
employees. I will discuss what these practices entail, secondly I will examine the legislation, 
if any regulating or impacting on the practice itself, thirdly I will examine a selection of cases 
which deal with the application and impact of the practice and lastly I will examine the extent 
to which privacy is infringed in light of that particular practice.  
 
 On completion of the analysis of these practices I will then discuss the admissibility of such 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRIVACY IN SOUTH 




The significance and nature of the right to privacy is indeed an important one as outlined in 
chapter one.  As a result of the importance of this right many countries had to provide some 
legal recognition either explicitly or by implication in their Constitutions. However such 
recognition was not instant but rather as a gradual development of the law. Hence in this 
chapter I will be focusing on the legal development of privacy protection in South Africa and 
in the United States. As indicated prior the reason as to why I chose these two different 
countries is because each country presents a different approach towards privacy protection. 
On the one hand South Africa provides for and protects the right to privacy explicitly in 
section 14 of the Constitution whereas the United States has no specific right to privacy in its 
Constitution but has instead found a way to protect privacy through other rights in its 
Constitution. My evaluation will be done by considering case law and legislation that has 




Common Law Protection 
 
The right to privacy in South Africa enjoys protection under both the common law and the 
Constitution. However this systematic protection under both the common law and the 
Constitution has not always been in place. The reason for this is that prior to both the 
Interim
26
 and the adoption of the Final Constitution of South Africa
27
 the right to privacy was 
only protected by the common law. “The common law recognises the right to privacy as an 
independent personality right that the courts consider to be part of the concept of dignitas”.
28
 
In terms of the common law, a breach of a person’s privacy constitutes an injuriarum. It is 
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  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (interim Constitution). 
27
 Note 7 above. 
28
 Note 19 above, para 68. 
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said to occur when there is an unlawful intrusion on someone’s personal privacy or an 
unlawful disclosure of private facts about a person.
29
 Further, in order to succeed for the 
invasion of privacy based on the action injuriarum the plaintiff must prove the following 
three elements: (i) wrongfulness (ii) intention and (iii) impairment of the plaintiff’s 




It is because of the failure of the common law to provide an independent right to privacy but 
rather to equate such right with one of the personality rights that the courts were reluctant to 




In the case of O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd
31
, the plaintiff, an unmarried 
woman, brought the action iniuriarum for the unauthorised use of her photograph and name 
in an advertisement for a company distributing rifles, pistols, revolvers and ammunition. The 
court in determining whether the plaintiff could reasonably have been subjected to offensive, 
degrading or humiliating treatment considered modern conditions and thought and concluded 
that “the unauthorised publication of a person’s photograph and name for advertising 
purposes constitutes an aggression upon the persons dignitas”.
32
 This decision has been 
critized by Neethling who states that by failing to offer a comprehensive definition of privacy 




Also in terms of the common law court’s judged the unlawfulness of a factual infringement 
of privacy in light of the boni mores and the general sense of justice of the community. As in 
the case of S v A
34
 where two private detectives placed a listening device under the dressing 
table of the complainant at the request of her estranged spouse. The court concluded that the 
two private detectives were liable for invading the complainant’s privacy. In reaching this 
decision Botha AJ reiterated that the right to privacy is included in the concept of dignitas 
and further that the “infringement of a person’s privacy prima facie constitutes an impairment 
                                                          
29
 Currie & De Waal Bill Of Rights Handbook 5th ed (2005) 316. 
30
 Note 4 above, 181. 
31
 O’Keefe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA. 
32
 Ibid, para 248. 
33
 Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Neethling’s Law of Personality (1996) 240. 
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 Importantly what was also stated in this case is that punishment for the 
impairment of one’s dignitas is dependent on the time, place and modes of thought and ways 
of life prevalent amongst a particular community. 
 
In Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd
36
 it was held that a breach of the right to 
privacy could occur either by way of an unlawful intrusion upon the privacy of another, or by 
way of unlawful disclosure of the private facts about a person.
37
 Further it was stated that the 
unlawfulness of a factual infringement of privacy is adjudged “in light of the contemporary 




It is thus evident that in terms of the common law the courts recognised the right to privacy as 
being one of the personality rights that was considered to be part of the concept of ‘dignitas’. 
“Despite recognising the existence of the right to privacy, the courts did not expressly attempt 
to define the concept of privacy”.
39
 It is because of this failure to recognise privacy as an 
independent right of its own that courts were unable to “identify circumstances in which they 








In 1993 South Africa enacted its first democratic Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa. Accordingly the Bill of Rights provided for a right to privacy in section 13: 
 
“ Every person shall have the right to his or her personal privacy which shall include the right 
not to be subject to searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of private 
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 Ibid, para 297. 
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 Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 2 SA 451 (A). 
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 Note 24 above, 58  
40
 Note 24 above, 58. 
41
 Note 26 above, section 13. 
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This provision had the effect of re-enforcing the importance of the right to privacy
42
 and 
significantly gave it its own status as a specific right, not enjoined with the familiar 




The Constitution of South Africa provides in section 14: 
 
“Everyone has the right to privacy, which shall include the right not to have; 
a) their person or home searched; 
b) their property searched; 
c) their possessions seized; or 




It is evident that there is no major difference between the privacy provisions in the Interim 
and Final Constitution. The first part of section 14 guarantees a general right to privacy 
whereas the second part protects against specific breaches of privacy such a search and 
seizures and infringements of the privacy of communications.
44
 On an analysis of section 14 
it is evident that it has had positive effects on the right to privacy, firstly it has enhanced and 
given meaning to the existing protection of privacy provided for by the common law
45
, 
secondly it has recognised privacy as an independent and important right,
46
 thirdly it has 
created new rights to privacy, that being substantive privacy rights which deals with 
protecting personal autonomy, and secondly informational privacy rights which deals with 
preventing disclosures and access to information
47
, lastly it requires courts to develop the 
existing common law so that “what once were victimless crimes are now lawful pursuits, the 
invasion of which creates a constitutional tort’.
48
 Apart from these, importantly is that the 
right to privacy provided for in section 14 is now also subject to the limitation clause in 
section 36 of the Constitution, thus although being a fundamental right it is not absolute. This 
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 Note 33 above, 239. 
43
 Note 7 above, section 14. 
44
 Note 29 above, 315. 
45
 Note 24 above, 61. 
46
 Note 24 above, 61. 
47
 Note 5 above, 147. 
48
 Dooley ‘Modern Tort Law’ 8 quoted by McQuoid-Mason ‘Privacy’ in The Constitutional Law of South 
Africa (eds) Chaskalson et al 18-7. 
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is relevant for the purposes of my dissertation because the question which arises is to what 





The Constitutional Court has heard and decided on a number of cases dealing with the right 
to privacy however it has not as yet dealt with the right to privacy in the employment context. 
The general trend of thinking of the Constitutional Court regarding the right to privacy is that 
such right warrants respect given its specific mention in the Constitution. However such right 
is not absolute and can be limited in terms of the limitation clause where it is reasonable and 








This case remains the “locus classicus” for the Constitutional right to privacy.
51
 The issue in 
this case concerned the constitutionality of sections 417 and 418 of the Companies Act 61 of 
1973, providing for the examination of persons and the disclosure of documents on company 
affairs. The applicants argued that these sections of the Act violated the privacy of a witness 
by forcing the witness to disclose books and documents the witness would under normal 
circumstances like to keep undisclosed and confidential. In this case Ackerman J held that 
“privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into communal 
relations and activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of a personal space 
shrinks accordingly”.
52
 He further found that the scope of privacy is “closely related to the 
concept of identity and that rights like the right to privacy are not based on the notion of the 





What is important to note in this case is that the right to privacy was viewed as a subjective 
expectation that society must consider as reasonable, and that such reasonable expectation 
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 Note 5 above, 148. 
50
 Note 19 above. 
51
 Note 24 above, 62. 
52
 Note 19 above, para 67. 
53
 Note 19 above, para 65.    
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exists only in the inner sanctum and the ‘truly personal realm’. It also established that privacy 
concerns diminish as one moves further from the personal realm and this is particularly 
important in the employment context as this reaffirms the approach of the Constitutional 
Court that the right to privacy is not absolute. 
 




The issue in this case was whether section 28(13) and section 24(14) read with section 29(5) 
of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 was inconsistent with the Final 
Constitution, particularly if those provisions authorising the search and seizure of documents, 
records and data breached the right to privacy in section 14 of the Constitution. Here Langa 
DP held that “section 14 does not only relate to the “truly personal realm or inner sanctum”. 
Thus when people are in their offices, in their cars or on mobile telephones, they retain the 
right to be left alone by the State unless certain conditions are satisfied. Wherever a person 
has the ability to decide what he or she reveals to the public, the expectation that such a 




Further the court stated that “privacy is a right which becomes intense the closer it moves to 









This case concerned section 28(1) of the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 
of 1965, which granted inspectors of medicines the authority to enter and inspect any 
premises, place, vehicle, vessel or aircraft in which they reasonably believe medicines or 
substances regulated by the Act are housed. 
 
In this case the court held that the degree of privacy that a citizen can reasonably expect 
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 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motors 2001 (1) SA 545. 
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 Ibid, para 16. 
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57
 Mistry v Interim Dental Council of South Africa 1998 (4) SA 1127 (CC). 
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Further the court stated that “the more public the undertaking and the more closely regulated, 
the more attenuated would the right to privacy be and the less intense the invasion” and “in 
the case of any regulated enterprise, the proprietors expectation of privacy with regard to the 
premises, equipment, materials and records must be attenuated by the obligation to comply 
with reasonable regulations and to tolerate the administrative inspections that are an 






It is evident from the preceding discussion that prior to the adoption of the Interim 
Constitution South Africa recognised the right to privacy as one of the personality rights and 
the infringement of such right as an impairment of dignitas. Although many court decisions 
recognised the right to privacy, such right was not specifically defined, and if it was there 
were too many inconsistent definitions. With the adoption of the Final Constitution privacy is 
now a right on its own and bears no attachment to the bundle of personality rights. It is still 
however not defined, but perhaps importantly for the purposes of my dissertation is that the 
court has stated that privacy becomes less intense as an individual moves away from the 
“inner sanctum” or “truly personal realm” and further that privacy depends on a subjective 






The development of the legal protection of privacy in the United States began with the 
invention of the printing press. The printing press increased individual access to information 
and as a result a need for the right to privacy had slowly emerged. 
 
Common Law Protection 
 
The common law protection of the right to privacy in the United States has its roots in an 
article by Brandeis and Warren entitled “The right to be let alone” published in the Harvard 
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Law Review in 1890.
61
 According to Warren and Brandeis the right to privacy sought to 
protect the plaintiffs “right to be left alone”. They described the concept of privacy as an 
“inviolate personality right that would protect thoughts, emotions and sensations whether 
expressed in writing or conduct, in conversation, in attitude or in facial expression. 
62
 They 
also argued that “the intensity and complexity of life and modern enterprise and invention 
ripened the time for the courts and judges to redefine the nature of personal rights to protect 
appearance, sayings, acts and personal relations, domestic or otherwise”.
63
 The authors in this 
article essentially sought a distinct right to privacy, and even though this article had little 





Constitutional Protection of Privacy 
 
In the United States of America, unlike South Africa there is no specific right to privacy in 
the Constitution.
65
 “The Constitutional protection of privacy in the United States is the 
product of a long line of Supreme Court decisions, in which the court went beyond the literal 
and sometimes narrow meaning of the Constitutional language to strike down federal or state 
legislation thereby in effect recognising a Constitutional right to privacy”.
66
 The Supreme 
Court has recognised that although there is no express constitutional right to privacy it is said 
to be implied in the First Amendment guaranteeing freedom of thought and expression
67
, in  
the Fourth amendment affirming the right of persons to be secure in their persons, in the Fifth 
amendment creating a zone for the individual in against self-incrimination
68
, in the Ninth 
amendment which provides that the enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution shall not 
be interpreted to deny or disparage others
69
 and lastly it is provided for in the penumbras of 
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In my analysis I will focus on a few number of cases that helped towards the constitutional 
protection of privacy. 
 




In this case the Supreme Court interpreted privacy rights as generalisations of two maxims 
namely “a man’s home is his castle” or “sanctity of the home” which were regarded as 
enforceable legal principles by the English common law.
72
 Further the court explained the 
right to privacy as the right against unlawful searches and seizures. 
 




It was this case which formulated the “reasonable expectation test” of the right to privacy. 
Here the defendant received a conviction for violating a statute proscribing interstate 
transmission by wire communication of bets and wagers after the FBI had listened to and 
recorded conversations the defendant had from a public telephone booth. The court held that 
the governments listening ad recording of the defendants conversations while using a public 
telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a search and seizure within the 
ambit of the fourth amendment. Further the court stated that the defendant “did not shed his 
right to privacy simply because he made calls from a place where he might be seen. No less 
than an individual in a business office, in a friend’s apartment, or in a taxi cab, a person in a 








This case was the first from a long line of United States Supreme Court decisions to pave the 
way for constitutional privacy.
76
 In this case the applicants were fined for contravening a 
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Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraception, for giving medical advice to a 
married couple on preventing contraception. Here the court found that there are various 
guarantees in the Bill Of Rights which creates zones of privacy, that being all the 
amendments and that the right to privacy was not to be confined to a marital context but 






In concluding it is evident that the printing press and the article by Warren and Brandeis 
which called for the recognition of a common law right to privacy was highly influential in 
the development of legal protection of privacy in the United States. As well as the number of 
Supreme Court cases which held that although the United States Constitution does not 
explicitly protect the right to privacy such right is protected through the various amendments. 
In comparison, privacy protection in South Africa is materially different, however the nature 
and significance of the right is substantially the same. Having analysed the development of 
privacy protection in South Africa what is important is the approach taken by the 
Constitutional Court where privacy is seen to diminish as one moves further away from the 
personal realm. Thus assuming that privacy in the workplace falls outside of the truly 
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Polygraph testing is widely used in some countries as an interrogation tool with criminal 
suspects or candidates for employment. In South Africa, employers are increasingly turning 
to the polygraph test, not only to detect dishonesty in the workplace but also for the purposes 
of pre-employment selection. Some companies go as far as to make passing a polygraph test a 
requirement of pre-employment selection and some include clauses in their employment 
contracts that compel employees to submit to polygraph testing on demand.
78
 In the United 
States of America the use of polygraph testing in the workplace is strictly monitored and 
limited in terms of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988.
79
 Whereas in South 
Africa no such legislation exists to control the use of such testing. Therefore the testing and 
admissibility of polygraphs will have to be evaluated against the backdrop of the rules of 
evidence and Constitutional principles. 
 
In this chapter the issues which I will be addressing is firstly what constitutes a polygraph 
test, secondly I will examine the legislation, if any, regulating or impacting on the use of 
polygraph testing, thirdly I will examine a selection of cases which dealt with the application 
and impact of polygraph testing and lastly I will examine the extent to which privacy is 
protected in the workplace in light of this practice. 
 
What is a polygraph test? 
 
“A polygraph is a device that measures and records several physiological indices such as 
blood pressure, pulse, respiration and skin conductivity while the examinee is asked and 
answers a series of questions”.
80
 Generally the examinee is asked questions which are directly 
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Although commonly referred to as a lie-detector, a polygraph does not measure lying or 
deception.
82
 It merely records physiological activity in the examinee. “An examiner purports 
to infer from the recorded physiological results that an examinee was deceptive in answering 
questions relating to a factual issue. The theoretical assumption underlying the use of 
polygraph testing is that a fear of detection will produce a measurable physiological reaction 
in a person who knows that he or she is lying. Accordingly, the polygraph purportedly 






There has been much debate and researchers are divided as to whether the polygraph can 
produce empirically and scientifically reliable results.
84
 “It has been submitted that there are 
three significant variables which can affect the accuracy of a polygraph examination: the 
examiner, the mental and physical state of the subject and the setting in which the 
examination takes place”.
85
 Most authorities are of the view that the examiner is the most 
important variable because he or she required to interpret the meaning of an intricate graphic 
pattern reflecting various responses to questions.
86
 A majority of polygraphers are not 
qualified psychologists so their level of expertise often does not allow them to discount the 
fact that other psychological states may produce the same bodily responses they infer as 
deception.
87
 As such, lying does not always result in feelings of guilt, fear or anxiety, it could 
very well be attributed to other factors such as boredom, or the discomfort of the polygraph 
machine. 
 
Critics of the test submit that there is no unique pattern of bodily responses that manifest 
when a person lies or fears detection. Polygraph tests only indicate that a person was in a 
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In a recent Labour Court case of FAWU obo Kapesi and Others v Premier Foods Ltd
89
, the 
court held that polygraph testing can do no more than record the veracity of a person’s 
answers to certain questions, and found that even on this score, scientists are divided.
90
 In 
view of the controversy surrounding the reliability of the polygraph test, the Court declined  
to accept that polygraph testing was a fair and objective way to assess the dishonesty and 
reliability of employees in a retrenchment exercise. The court held that the results of a 
polygraph may be taken into account in assessing the credibility of a witness and in assessing 
the probabilities where other supporting evidence is available, provided also that it is clear 
from the evidence that the test was done according to acceptable and recognised standards.
91
 
Problematically however is that the court did not determine what constitutes acceptable and 
recognised polygraph test standards and the qualifications of polygraphists. 
 
So to, in the case of Steen v Wetherlys (Pty) (Ltd)
92
, the commissioner held that to date there 
is nothing either in the body of research or in the authority of any case law to convincingly 
suggest that polygraphers are in fact expert witnesses or that they are medically qualified to 
interpret the physiological responses of witnesses. In addition such evidence is inconclusive 
and does no more than to indicate that the subject was in a heightened state of general 
emotional arousal. The polygraphist is often a stranger and the test may be given in an 
unfamiliar environment. This alone may cause increased nervousness and physiological 
responses in the body. A further factor is the natural fear in the mind of the innocent that the 
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South Africa does not have any specific legislation or codes of practice that deal with the 
issue of polygraph testing. The only Act that has some relation to the issue of Polygraph 
testing is the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998
94
, in section 8 which states: 
 
8. Psychological testing and other similar assessments 
 
Psychological testing and other similar assessments of an employee are prohibited unless the 
test or assessment being used- 
 
(a) has been scientifically shown to be valid and reliable 
(b) can be applied fairly to all employees; and 
(c) is not biased against any employee or group. 
 
The question that arises however is whether a polygraph test can be classified as a 
psychological or other similar assessment. Gondwe submits that “polygraph tests are clearly 
not psychological assessments as they measure a subject’s physiological reactions to draw an 
inference of truthfulness”. “It is further unlikely that a polygraph test can qualify as a “similar 
assessment”, again and in contrast to psychological or psychometric tests, because they do 
not measure personality traits”.
95
 A contributing factor to this is that because the scientific 
validity and reliability of polygraph testing remains unresolved or contested, polygraph 




The only protection that the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995
97
 provides is the right of every 
employee to fair labour practices and not to be unfairly discriminated against or dismissed. It 
thus evident that South Africa seriously lacks any legislation regulating the manner in which 
polygraph testing is applied in the workplace. As a result, ‘legislation similar to the United 
States Employee Polygraph Protection Act
98
 in South Africa would require that guidelines be 
created for adjudicators pertaining to the admissibility, reliability and weight to be given to 
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polygraph tests in an effort to create consistency and uniformity”.
99
 This may be the most 




In this section I will review a selection of cases which show how courts and the Council for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) indicate how a polygraph test is to be 
applied as well as the approach they take when they are confronted with a polygraph test as 
evidence. In South Africa the results of a polygraph test have from time to time been used as 
evidence against employees in issues regarding unfair dismissal. However the issue of the 
admissibility of such evidence has been treated very inconsistently. 
 
In the case of Mahlangu v CIM Deltak
100
 which was heard before the Industrial Court the 
court found that the use of voice analyst tests administered by an unregistered psychiatrist 
was unscientific, invalid, unethical and unlawful. 
 
In Mncube v Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd
101
 it was accepted that the polygraphist who 
conducted the test was qualified but the question was raised whether the evidence was 
reliable. 
 
So to, in the case of Sobiso & Others v Ceramic Tile Market
102
 the commissioner observed 
that there is no clear approach as to the admissibility of polygraph test results, there were 
instead divergent approaches. It was also observed that generally tribunals take a cautionary 
approach to the reliability of polygraph evidence, in that polygraph tests alone cannot prove a 
person’s guilt without corroborative evidence to support the inference of guilt. The court held 




 The person administering the tests, while an expert in the polygraph field, was neither a 
qualified doctor nor psychologist. 
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 The tests were simply an indicator of deception and could not give details on the extent of 
the misconduct. 
 The sole reliance on the polygraph results was insufficient to discharge the onus on the 
employer in terms of s192 of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 to prove the dismissal was 
fair. 
 
The most recent case reported on polygraph testing is the case of Truworths v Council for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration
104
. Here the court found that “although it is trite law 
that the probative value of a polygraph test on its own is not sufficient to find a person guilty, 
the result of a polygraph test is, however, one of the factors that may be considered in 
evaluating the fairness of a dismissal”.
105
 The court went on further that “however, a 
polygraph may be taken into account where other supporting evidence is available provided 
also that there is clear evidence on the qualifications of the polygraphist and provided that it 







 suggested a three step enquiry into the admissibility of polygraph test 
results,  namely (i) whether the evidence is relevant and reliable (ii) whether the evidence 
assists the court in determining the facts in issue, and (iii) whether the evidence has an 
unfairly prejudicial effect, if it does, that would substantially outweigh its probative value. 
 
In conclusion given the fact that there is no consensus in the scientific community that 
polygraph evidence is reliable and no regulatory framework in South Africa on what 
constitutes acceptable and recognized polygraph test standards and qualifications for 
polygraphists, the inquiry into admissibility would most likely cause a number of legal 
disputes. The examinee who is a party to the proceedings may be procedurally disadvantaged 
or otherwise exposed to a lengthy trial involving issues which, though logically relevant, are 
legally too remote to assist the court in its ultimate decision on the merits.
108
 Evidently there 
is a need for proper guidelines on the way this evidence should be viewed and applied within 
the South African context 
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“Privacy can have an impact on our bodily privacy, personal information, communication and 
even our intellectual capacity”.
109
 This right however is not absolute and will have to be 
balanced against other rights in order to sustain laws and order. The South African 
Constitution
110
 protects an individual’s right to privacy in section 14. It is alleged that the use 
of polygraph examinations may infringe the right to privacy. 
 




 The attempt to penetrate the ‘inner domain’ of individual belief in violation of the 
constitutional distinction between acts and beliefs; 
 The interference with the individuals sense of autonomy and reserve created by a machine 
sensing his emotional responses to personal questions; 
 The increased psychological power that authorities acquire over individuals seeking 
employment or already in employment. 
 
My submission is that polygraph tests certainly do infringe the privacy rights of employees 
by compelling them to communicate those personal facts and emotions which there have 
chosen to exclude from the knowledge of outsiders. With this form of testing, employees are 
always, the disadvantaged party in an unfair position almost being dominated by a machine 
that is able to make  certain assumptions which are not necessarily correct. Nothing is 
essentially private any longer with the use of this machine and in my opinion is a gross 




“By informing or giving the employee the assurance that the undertaking of the polygraph 
test is voluntary does not safeguard the employer against the infringement of the employees 
right to privacy”.
113
 This is because in the event of the employee declining to take the 
polygraph test it is almost a foregone conclusion that the employer’s first assumption is that 
                                                          
109
 Daniel Francisco Calaca The Use Of Polygraph Tests and Related Evidentiary Aspects In Labour Disputes 
(unpublished LLM thesis, University of Pretoria, 2010) 32. 
110
 Note 7 above. 
111
 Note 81 above, 29. 
112
 Note 7 above. 
113
 Note 109 above, 33. 
33 
 
the refusal is an admission of guilt. A very quick, selfishly thought reaction by the employer 
without having any regard to the fact that the employee might be innocent but is just not 
comfortable with taking the test. It is thus evident of how polygraph testing operates in such 




It can be concluded that polygraph testing in the workplace is here to stay and is becoming a 
more lucrative mechanism for employers to detect theft, fraud and dishonesty. As a result of 
this it is important that legislation be enacted  which sets out the circumstances in which 
polygraph tests may be done together with the procedure that needs to be followed. Equally 
important is that the question of who should be permitted to do the testing and what 
qualifications they should possess needs to be addressed urgently. At the least in my opinion 
a degree in medicine or psychology is what a polygraphist should have in order to understand 
the human body and how it functions when placed under stress.  
 
My viewpoint is that submitting an employee to a polygraph test is not a fair labour practice. 
These tests infringe the privacy rights of employees because they essentially attempt to 
penetrate the private inner domain of an individual  by compelling communication of 
thoughts, sentiments and emotions which the examinee may have chosen not to 
communicate.
114
 I have indicated that the polygraph tests cannot detect deceit or lies and 
neither is there any scientific research that proves a polygraph to be 100 percent reliable. This 
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South Africa has one of the highest HIV/Aids rates on the globe. Notwithstanding global 
efforts to manage and contain the HIV/Aids epidemic it continues to grow rapidly.
115
 “In 
South Africa projections show that the number of people who test positive for HIV is likely 
to double every nine to eleven months”.
116
 The impact of this poses a direct challenge to the 
labour force in South Africa as businesses are increasingly concerned about the impact of the 
disease on their organisations. 
 
 A 2001 report-“The Economic Impact of HIV/Aids in Southern Africa”
117
-expounded on the 
major impact of HIV/Aids on labour productivity, economic growth and social development. 
 
“The spread of HIV/Aids reduces labour productivity, raises private and public consumption 
and thereby reduces income and savings, with lower savings, the rate of investment falls, 
reinforcing the decline of economic growth. The loss of labour productivity occurs because a 
large share of the work force becomes debilitated and dies causing organizations to lose 
workers with critical skills. Skilled personnel are lost and valuable labour time is consumed 
when workers become debilitated, and work schedules are disrupted when organisations 





As a result and in response to the spread and major impact of the epidemic employers, in 
order to safeguard their own interests and maintain productivity have resorted to mandatory 
HIV/Aids testing either in the recruitment stages or during employment. This is where the 
issue of the right to privacy in the workplace becomes uncertain and the right not to be 
discriminated on the grounds of one’s HIV positive status becomes relevant. 
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Hence in this chapter I will be focusing on the legislation that governs HIV/Aids testing in 
the workplace, I will be analysing case law dealing with such issue and I will thereafter 
explain the impact of such testing  on an employee’s right to privacy. 
 
Arguments for HIV/Aids Testing in the Workplace: 
 
1. The employer has a freedom choice as to whom to hire, which freedom is founded on the 
legal principles of freedom of association and freedom of choice”. 
2. “It is well known that the risk of occupational transmission of the HIV virus is unlikely, 
but this does not mean that the risk is non-existent. For this reason, some employers feel 
they have a responsibility to prevent occupational transmission of the virus by testing 
both prospective and existing employees”. 
3. HIV positive persons, although not yet symptomatic, may experience psychoneurological 
symptoms such as dementia. As such, in some occupations (for example in the case of an 
aircraft/airline pilot and mine lift operator) a sudden onset of AIDS dementia may be very 
risky”. 
4. “The employment of persons with HIV has costs associated with recruitment, training and 




Arguments against HIV/Aids testing in the workplace: 
 
1. “Requiring an employee or a prospective employee to undergo an HIV test as a general 
condition of employment may infringe an individual’s constitutional rights, such as the 
right to physical integrity and privacy. These inherent and constitutionality protected 
rights should trump the employers right to contractual freedom in those instances where 
an employee’s HIV positive status has no bearing on the job”. 
2. “The risk of occupational transmission argument is valid only where an employee is 
exposed or will be exposed to procedures constituting possible modes of transmission 
such as surgical procedure in the case of a surgeon”. 
3. “HIV is not a reliable or conclusive indicator of dementia, in fact psychometric testing is 
perhaps the better indicator of any neurological impairment”. 
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4. “HIV positive employees may continue to be productive members of society for a long 
period of time after contracting the virus. Moreover, the costs associated with employing 
HIV positive persons are similar to those borne by commitments to equality and the 
prohibition on unfair discrimination”. 
5. “The fear and antagonism surrounding HIV/Aids cannot justify discrimination against 
individuals living with the illness, particularly in those countries with a history of 
discrimination”.
120
 This bear’s direct relevance to South Africa as we have emerged from 
a past characterised with prejudice and victimisation, therefore in order to achieve true 
equality we cannot afford to still discriminate against those living with the virus. 
 
From this it is evident that this is a highly contentious issue in the workplace with competing 
arguments and at many instances seems like the employers contractual freedom and 
authoritative position outweighs the employee’s constitutional right to dignity and privacy. 
The crux of the issue however is whether testing for HIV in the workplace is ever justified 






Section 10: Human Dignity 
 




Section 12(2): Freedom and Security of the Person 
 
“Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity which includes the right- 
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Most importantly is section 14 of the Constitution which recognises the right to privacy and it 
is this provision which protects or which should protect employees against HIV testing in the 
workplace. In South Africa legislation regulating HIV/Aids testing in the workplace is 
contained in the Employment Equity Act
123
 and the South African Code of Good Practice on 




The Employment Equity Act 
 






(1) Medical testing of an employee is prohibited, unless- 
(a) legislation permits or requires the testing; or 
(b) it is justifiable in the light of medical facts, employment conditions, social policy, the 
fair distribution of employee benefits or the inherent requirements of a job”. 
 
(2) “Testing of an employee to determine that employee’s HIV status is prohibited unless 
such testing is determined to be justifiable by the Labour Court in terms of section 50(4) 






(3) If the Labour  Court declares that medical testing of an employee as contemplated in 
section 7 is justifiable, the court may make any order that it considers appropriate in the 
circumstances including imposing conditions relating to- 
(a) the provision of counselling 
(b) the maintenance of confidentiality 
(c) the period during which the authorisation for any testing applies, and 
(d) the category or categories of jobs or employees in respect of which the authorisation 
for testing applies”. 
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It is thus clear that in terms of the Employment Equity Act
127
 the testing of employees or a 
prospective employee is strictly curtailed and is only permitted where the Labour Court 
deems fit.
128
 “However, the Labour Court has held that employers need not apply for 





The South African Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects of HIV/Aids: 
 
The South African Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects of HIV/Aids
130
 which aims at 
creating a non-discriminatory environment and which recognises that the protection of the 
human rights and dignity of people living with HIV/Aids needs to be respected provides that 
there should be no compulsory testing of employees. This is also an important piece of 
legislation dealing with HIV/Aids testing. 
 
Section 7: HIV Testing Confidentiality and Disclosure
131
 
7.1. HIV Testing   
7.1.1. No employer may require an employee, or an applicant for employment, to undertake 
an HIV test in order to ascertain that employee’s HIV status. As provided for in the 
Employment Equity Act, employers may approach the Labour Court to obtain 
authorisation for testing.    
7.1.4. Authorised testing  
Employers must approach the Labour Court for authorisation in, amongst others, the 
following circumstances:  
(I) during an application for employment;  
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(ii) As a condition of employment;  
7.1.5. Permissible testing 
(a) An employer may provide testing to an employee who has requested a test in 
the following circumstances: 
(I) as part of a health care service provided in the workplace;  
(ii) In the event of an occupational accident carrying a risk of exposure to 
blood or other body fluids;  
(iii) For the purposes of applying for compensation following an 
occupational accident involving a risk of exposure to blood or other 
body fluids. 
(b) Furthermore, such testing may only take place within the following defined 
conditions:  
(I) at the initiative of an employee;  
(ii) Within a health care worker and employee-patient relationship;  
(iii) With informed consent and pre- and post-test counselling, as defined 
by the Department of Health’s National Policy on Testing for HIV; and  
(iv) With strict procedures relating to confidentiality of an employee’s HIV 
status as described in clause 7.2 of this Code.   
7.2. Confidentiality and Disclosure 
7.2.1.  All persons with HIV or AIDS have the legal right to privacy. An employee is 






Analysis of Case Law: 
PFG Building Glass v CEPPAWU & Others:
132
 
In this case the issue was whether anonymous and voluntary testing of employees for 
HIV/Aids fell within the ambit of section 7(2) of the Employment Equity Act.  The Labour 
Court stated that the right to bodily and psychological integrity in section 12 (2) (c) of the 
Constitution and the right to privacy were not absolute and had to be balanced against the 
competing fundamental rights of employers, shareholders and regulators, such as the right to 
access to information and the right to trade.
133
 Further the court stated that “in limiting the 
right of employees to have control over their bodies, employers have a duty to guarantee that 
other rights such as the right to privacy, dignity, equality, fair labour practices, to choose a 
trade, occupation or profession and to access to court are not violated”.
134
 
In relation to the right to privacy the court stated that “the right to privacy deserves more than 
superficial treatment in the context of HIV testing. There is a plethora of publications and 
reports about the prejudice endured by those living with HIV/Aids. Disclosing the identity of 
employees who are positive runs the risk of exposing them to public ostracization. Invasion 
of the right to privacy could create real hardships for the HIV/Aids sufferers. Therefore this 




The court was of the opinion that although the objective of the protection against HIV/Aids 
testing is to prevent discrimination and promote equality, the test for the justifiability of 
testing for HIV goes beyond determining whether such testing is equitable or not.
136
 The 
court reasoned that the test for the justifiability of HIV testing is also a constitutional enquiry 




In concluding the court interpreted section 7 (2) of the Code on Good Practice so as not to 
impose a limitation on employees in the exercise of their constitutional rights in section 12 
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(2) (b) and section 12 (2) (c) of the Constitution.
138
 Accordingly the court found that 




Hoffmann v South African Airways
140
 
This case was decided in terms of the right to equality, however it recognised that respect for 
the human dignity of all human beings is essential in our new democracy and that there is no 
place for stereotyping. 
In this case the applicant was HIV positive and was considered unsuitable for the position of 
flight attendant. He had undergone a pre-screening interview, a psychometric test and a 
formal interview successfully but was denied the job based on his HIV status. South African 
Airways argued that its operational requirements and employment policies and practices 
excluded the applicant from the position of flight attendant. The court held that an employer 
may not exclude an applicant from employment on the basis of their HIV status, especially if 
it has no bearing on the job.
141
 
South African Security Forces Union and Others v Surgeon General and Others
142
 
In this case the issue concerned the constitutionality of a policy which excluded persons with 
HIV/Aids from being recruited, promoted or deployed on international missions if they tested 
HIV positive. It was argued that such policy was unconstitutional in that it unreasonably and 
unjustifiably infringed on the right not to be unfairly discriminated against in terms of section 
9(3) of the Constitution and the right to privacy in terms of section 14 of the Constitution.
143
 
This matter was settled however with the parties agreeing that the SANDF policy was 
unconstitutional in that it unreasonably and unjustifiably infringed the rights of aspirant and 
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current HIV positive SANDF members. The court gave the SANDF 6 months within which 




It cannot be disputed that the HIV/Aids pandemic is undoubtedly a serious one which has 
wide ranging consequences. Its impact on the workforce is damaging and as a result 
employers have resorted to testing current as well as future employees for the virus. My 
submission is that such testing encroaches upon the privacy of such individuals. Privacy is a 
constitutionally protected right and as a result should not be infringed where an employee’s 
HIV positive status has no bearing on the job. HIV/Aids in itself comes with a lot of 
stigmatisation and in a workplace environment employees will be victimised and belittled by 
other ‘negative’ employees. “In the workplace privacy protection is essential because it 
preserves and maintains the autonomy, dignity and wellbeing of employees in an 
environment where the employer in general yields more influence and authority than the 
employee.”
145
 HIV/Aids testing invades such privacy of employees who choose to keep the 
nature of their status, be it negative or positive to themselves. Employees with the virus may 
very well be productive for many years and as such the nature of their ‘status’ may be 
nothing more than a ‘status’. 
Not only is the testing of current employee’s privacy invasive, so too is pre-employment 
testing. “The underlying rationale for pre-employment testing is to ensure a labour force that 
is free of HIV infection. However given statistical trends on the spread of the virus in South 
Africa, this is probably impossible”.
146




 they cite 
a number of reasons why pre=employment testing should not be done, these include: 
 “An employee who is HIV positive may have many years of productive and healthy 
working life ahead of him or her”. 
 “The nature of the disease means that no employment environment can ever be isolated 
from employees who are HIV positive and renders pre-testing meaningless”. 
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 “It places the medical practitioner in a difficult ethical position in deciding how much 
information to divulge to the employer and to the job applicant”. 
 “An employee may be HIV negative when the test is done, but after taking up 
employment either transmit or acquire the virus”. 
Thus it can be seen that pre-employment testing is not really endorsed and is discriminatory 
especially when it has no bearing on the job. The prospective employer protrudes on the 
privacy of the individual who might want to keep his or her status confidential, but because 
the applicant is desperate for the job he or she gives in. 
Having outlined how HIV/Aids testing infringes on the privacy of employees and prospective 
employees it is important to note that in some categories of work, involving a high level of 
skill and those involving risks, the testing of employees may be required as compulsory. 
Where this is required then I submit that the individual concerned must give informed 
consent and fully understand that if the application is declined on the basis of HIV status why 
that is so. 
Conclusion: 
In concluding it can be seen that HIV/Aids testing in the workplace is very prevalent 
considering the rapid rate of infection in South Africa. This however does not mean that such 
testing is endorsed and correct. The ideal behind privacy is to a certain extent diminished by 
testing individuals in a workplace environment. These individuals are already the subject of 
much victimisation and discrimination and therefore by bringing their HIV status into the 
workplace this just furthers the stigma that HIV/Aids is associated with. Although there is a 
lot of legislation protecting HIV/Aids individuals, when it comes to the workplace the 








BODY SEARCHES, WORKSTATION SEARCHES AND VIDEO SURVELLANCE IN 
THE WORKPLACE. 
Introduction: 
Although under section 14 of the Constitution every person has the right to privacy the courts 
have generally found that this right can be limited in the workplace and that there must be a 
balancing of interests of the employer and the employee. The general principle is that 
employer cannot conduct searches without the employees consent or unless it has a good 
reason to suspect the employee is abusing the system or conducting unethical business. An 
exception to the general principle would be in instances where there was no legitimate 
expectation of privacy. “A legitimate expectation connotes that one must have a subjective 
expectation of privacy. But, at the same time, society must recognize this as objectively 
reasonable”.
149
 “The subjective component of the test recognizes that a person cannot 
complain about an invasion of privacy if he or she has consented explicitly or impliedly to it. 
The objective component is more important, but is often quite difficult to assess the kinds of 
privacy protection that society would recognise as objectively reasonable”.
150
 In determining 
what is legitimate depends on the circumstances of each case and the nature of the workplace. 
An example of the exception to the general principle would be of an employee who works in 
a top secret weapons factory or a diamond mine, in these working environments employees 
can expect to be constantly monitored and subject to spot searches. 
The Constitutional Court has pointed out that “privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal 
realm, but as a person moves into communal relations and activities such as business and 
social interaction the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly”.
151
 In light of this 
shrinkage however it would be unreasonable to hold that an employee has no expectation to 
privacy in the workplace whatsoever.  
It is against this background that in this chapter I will examine the practices of body searches, 
workstation searches and monitoring through video surveillance in the workplace and how 
these practices infringe the privacy of employees. 
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In many industries body searches are very common and are considered as a routine in the 
workplace. The question that arises however is whether such search is a violation of the right 
to privacy. One is certainly invading another’s private sphere when conducting a body search 
and perhaps what is vital is how the search is conducted. “Searches of employees should be 




The Code of Good Practice on the Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases
153
 defines sexual 
harassment as “unwanted conduct of a sexual nature”. The unwanted nature of sexual 
harassment distinguishes it from behaviour that is welcome and mutual.
154
 The Code lists the 
following as possibly falling under sexual harassment:
155
   
a. “Physical conduct of a sexual nature includes all unwanted physical contact, ranging from 
touching to sexual assault and rape, and includes a strip search by or in the presence of the 
opposite sex. 
b. Verbal forms of sexual harassment include unwelcome innuendoes, suggestions and hints, 
sexual advances, comments with sexual overtones, sex-related jokes or insults or unwelcome 
graphic comments about a person’s body made in their presence or directed toward them, 
unwelcome and inappropriate enquiries about a person’s sex life, and unwelcome whistling 
directed at a person or group of persons. 
c. Non-verbal forms of sexual harassment include unwelcome gestures, indecent exposure, 
and the unwelcome display of sexually explicit pictures and objects”. 
From this it is evident that in order for employers to meet the requirements of this Code, they 
must ensure that properly trained personnel carry out the body search and that they are aware 
of the importance of courtesy and dignity whilst conducting these searches. An important 
factor as well is that body searches should be conducted by members of the same sex as the 
employee being searched. This will create a more comfortable environment for the employee 
being searched. 
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Body searches is an extremely privacy invasive measure and as such should be conducted 
when absolutely necessary and when consent is obtained from the employee. Bodily integrity 




It has been well argued that an employer has the right of access to every part of its premises 
and property.
156
Ideally this includes an employee’s computer and desk. Although this may be 
the position, what is equally important to remember is that employees spend many hours in 
the workplace and it is reasonable to expect a measure of privacy in certain areas one being 
their workstation.
157
 It is an area where employees not only keep related information but also 
matters of a personal nature and hence they regard it as personal space. 
 
“Given the fact that work takes up a lot of our time and energy and plays a significant part in 
our lives and how we conduct ourselves, it could be argued that an employee has a legitimate 
expectation to some form of privacy in the workplace”.
158
 Such expectation can reasonably 
be said to exist at the workstation of an employee who besides the keeping of work related  
information often regards his or her workstation as “home away from home, complete with 






In the case of Moonsamy v The Mailhouse
160
 the court held “that it is extremely difficult to 
clarify at least with any precision, the nature of the right to privacy of an employee on the 
premises of an employer during working hours.”
161
 This shows the difficult nature of 
harmonising both the interests of the employer and the employee regarding workplace 
privacy 
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In the case of Katz v US,
162
 the US Supreme Court held that the individual is entitled to a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. “This reasonable expectation could only exist when the 
individual had a subjective expectation of privacy, and secondly, that society must recognize 
the expectation as reasonable. Within the context of the employment relationship, the second 




Further, the U.S Supreme Court in the case of O’Connor v Ortega,
164
 found “that office 
practices and procedures, and legitimate employer regulations might reduce the employee’s 
expectations of privacy in their offices, desks and filing cabinets. Given the great variety of 
work environments,  the question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of 






 correctly submits that “your work or occupation is a pivotal influence on 
your life , both personal and professional. The rights that a citizen is entitled to in his or her 
personal life cannot  simply disappear in his or her professional life as a result of the 
employer’s business necessity “.
167
 I strongly agree with this proposition  as an employee’s 
personal rights  should be given greater weight as oppose to an employer’s right to economic 
activity. An employer who has done his interviewing and selection procedures correctly 
should be able to expect trust and loyalty from an employee and should not have to resort to 
the drastic measure of searching an employee’s workstation. This can also reduce an 
employee’s confidence and potential in the workplace by making him or her feel somewhat 




“Employers may wish to use surveillance in the workplace for a variety of beneficial reasons, 
including employee safety, prevention of theft, supervision of employees and reducing the 
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 Despite these ‘good’ reasons advanced for surveillance in the 
workplace there are negative aspects. The use of camera surveillance in the workplace makes 
employees feel that they are constantly watched and that their employer does not trust them. 
This in turn may lead to feelings of resentment and inhibit an employee’s capacity to work 
effectively knowing that they are being policed all the time. 
 
Understandably in certain industries employers are extremely vulnerable to losses because of 
employee misconduct. Such industries include casinos, security firms, jewellers and financial 
institutions.
169
 As a result an employer may have to utilize video surveillance. Importantly in 
these cases is that employers need to make employees aware that they are being monitored 
due to valid operational reasons and furthermore due consideration must be given to the right 
of privacy of an employee and hence employers should not install surveillance cameras in 




Video surveillance has been accepted in some cases and not in others due to the fact that 
certain circumstances can render such footage unacceptable. In the case of Afrox Ltd v Laka 
and Others
170
 the Labour Court found that the arbitrator’s decision to disallow video footage 





In the case of Satawu abo Assagai v Autopax
172
 the employee was trapped on video carrying 
out a dishonest transaction. The employee argued that the video tape evidence should be 
disallowed because he was unaware that he was being taped. However the arbitrator found 
that the taped interaction was not a confidential one and therefore did not fall under the 
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prohibition of the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act.
173
 This act being replaced 
with RICA, which imposes much heavier burdens on employers, will result in arbitrators not 
too readily admitting video surveillance. 
 
Interestingly, an arbitration tribunal recently decided
174
 on whether it was legal for a federally 
regulated Canadian employer to install 27 video cameras in and around its workplace. The 
tribunal noted that a determination of whether the surveillance cameras were legal, required 
an assessment of the parties respective interests, pointing out that in accordance with the 
collective agreement, the employer was obliged  to treat its employees with ‘consideration’ 




As the foundation for its analysis the court used the four stage test out in the case of 
Eastmond v Canadian Pacific Railway:
176
 
 Were the surveillance cameras and recording system necessary to meet a specific need of 
the employer? 
 Were the cameras likely to be effective in meeting that need? 
 Was the loss of privacy proportional to the benefit gained? 
 Was there a less privacy invasive way of achieving the same end? 
 
Based on the above, the tribunal ruled that the indoor cameras that kept watch over 
employees on a continuous basis, without a valid reason, were to be removed, while the 





My submission regarding video surveillance is that unless it is absolutely necessary to 
monitor employees through such a mechanism, it should be refrained from. “Electronic 
surveillance should not be used as a substitute for monitoring by management. Rather 
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technology should be used as a supplement to good old fashioned supervising”.
178
 An 
employer must produce evidence that it has valid reasons for using video surveillance and 
that he or she has given due consideration to the employees right to privacy. 
 
Conclusion: 
Having analysed the practices of body searches, workstation searches and monitoring through 
video surveillance it is evident that they all to a certain extent infringe the privacy rights of 
employees in the workplace. Kevin J Conlon is of the view that monitoring devices have 
liberally brought “big brother” into the office.
179
 All these practices utilized by an employer 
essentially make the employee feel constantly under the watch and dishonest in an ‘honest 
way’. “Proponents of legislative reform of workplace privacy laws believe that the use of 
bugging devices, employee monitoring computers and video cameras have turned jobsites 
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In the information age that we currently live in, communication through letters, fax, and 
office memos have in most cases become redundant. Instead, Internet and Email have 
replaced these traditional modes of communication and have altered the business 
environment. “Email has replaced memos and other correspondence, computers have 
replaced filing cabinets, and the Internet has allowed people access to virtually unlimited 
information without ever leaving their desks”.
181
 “Communication facilities have linked the 
office with the home and the home with the office and hence the border between office and 
home has become fuzzy”. 
182
This has resulted in a number of issues as far as privacy in the 
workplace is concerned. 
  
Although Internet and Email have become the preferred method of communication in today’s 
business environment, employers believe that monitoring is necessary in order to prevent 
illicit activity and to limit liability.
183
 This monitoring however which the employer finds it 
necessary to conduct gives rise to two conflicting interests, namely the employers right to 
conduct his or her business according to his or her prerogative, and on the other hand the 
employees right to privacy. Viewed from the employer’s perspective it may be argued that 
privacy is not an absolute right and that it needs to be balanced against business necessity. 
Furthermore the employer can also argue that he or she has a right to protect the business 
interests and integrity of his or her technological equipment against viruses, excessive use 
and ‘cyber loafing’.
184
 These rights however must be weighed up against the privacy rights of 
an employee.  
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The problem that monitoring presents for employers is that it “is detrimental to employee 
privacy and creates unnecessary stress that has a direct negative impact on emotional and 
physical health of the employees, which can have a detrimental effect on work 
productivity”.
185
  This is unfortunate because although privacy is not an absolute right it does 
deserve recognition and protection in the workplace especially because “the once demarcated 
boundaries between work and private life have become more and more blurred and in many 
cases eroded through new ways of working and technological developments”. As a 
consequence of this in my opinion I believe that employees should be accorded a degree of 
privacy in the workplace which will include some personal use of the employer’s 
technological resources. This will result in a workplace environment which is more 
conducive to employees needs in this current age that we live in and also will in turn result in 
enhanced productivity for the employer. 
 
With that being said, my focus in this chapter firstly will be on an analysis of the legislation, 
most importantly RICA which proscribes to what extent an employer may monitor electronic 
communication in the workplace, secondly I will examine a selection of cases which dealt 
with telephone tapping, and the monitoring of employees Email and Internet and 
communication and lastly I will explain the extent to which privacy is protected in the 
workplace in light of this practice, This will be done by illustrating that although employers 
advance a number of reasons as justification for the monitoring of telephone, Internet and 
Email communication, the main reason being to ensure a productive and efficient workplace, 
at the same time employees have a right to privacy and such right does not cease to exist once 
they enter the employment relationship. 
 
Legislation: 
Section 14(d) of the Constitution provides “that everyone has a right not to have the privacy 
of their communications infringed”. This aspect of privacy is known as informational 
privacy.
186
 According to De Waal and Currie informational privacy “should be construed as 
safeguarding the interest of an individual to restrict the collection, storage and use of personal 
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information concerning him or her”.
187
 A proviso to this principle however is that an 
individual’s expectation of informational privacy must be reasonable.
188
 Also, it is important 
to remember that the constitutional right to privacy is not absolute and will have to be 
balanced against section 36 of the Constitution.
189
 An important case which interpreted the 
concept of informational privacy was that of Mistry v Interim Dental Council of South 
Africa,
190
 in this case the court considered the following factors to determine whether an 
individual’s expectation of informational privacy was reasonable: whether the information 
was obtained in an intrusive manner, whether it was about intimate aspects of an individual’s 
life, whether it involved data provided by the individual for one purpose, which  was then 
used for another purpose and lastly whether it was disseminated to persons from whom the 




Apart from the Constitutional protection afforded to privacy the critical question of whether 
and to what extent an employee may monitor electronic communications in the workplace 
was answered when the Legislature formulated the Regulation of Interception of 





Prior to the enactment of RICA, there existed the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition 
Act
192
 which regulated monitoring.  The IMPA prohibited the interception of confidential 
information; however its biggest failure was that it was not applicable in the private sphere 
such as the workplace.
193
  Hence the scope of RICA is much wider and is concerned with 
interception in both the private and public spheres and applies to private sector employees 
and employers. 
 
RICA prohibits, with exceptions, the intentional interception of direct or indirect 
communications. More specifically, section 2 of the Act contains the general prohibition, it 
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states that “no person may intentionally intercept or attempt to intercept, or authorise or 
procure any other person to intercept or attempt to intercept at any place in the Republic, any 
communication in the course of its occurrence or transmission”.
194
 A contravention of the 
provisions of RICA constitutes a criminal offence
195
 and could lead to the imposition of a 




The term “communication” in the Act is defined to include both “direct” and 
“indirect”communication.  
 




(a) oral communication. other than an indirect communication. between two or 
more persons which occurs in the immediate presence of all the persons 
participating in that communication; or 
 
(b) utterance by a person who is participating in an indirect communication, if the 
utterance is audible to another person who. at the time that the indirect 
communication occurs, is in the immediate presence of the person participating 
in the indirect communication; 
 




the transfer of information, including a message or any part of a message whether- 
 
(a ) in the form of- 
 
(i) speech, music or other sounds; data, text, visual images, whether animated or not;      
signals; or radio frequency spectrum; or 
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(b)       in any other form or in any combination of forms, that is transmitted in whole or 
or in part by means of a postal service or a telecommunication system. 
 
The definition of “intercept” is also contained in section one and reads as follows: 
The aural or other acquisition of the contents of any communication through the use of any 
means, including an interception device, so as to make some or all of the contents of a 
communication available to a person other than the sender or recipient or intended recipient 
of that communication, and includes the (a) monitoring of any such communication by means 
of a monitoring device; (b) viewing, examination or inspection of the contents of any indirect 
communication; and (c) diversion of any indirect communication from its intended 
destination to any other destination. 
 
The prohibition in section 2 applies only to third party interception; not participant 
interception, i.e. when one of the parties to the communication records and/or divulges it to a 
third party.
199
 A third party may intercept a communication with the consent of one of the 
parties to the communication or access communications that are in the public domain, such as 
unrestricted access to facebook.
200
 To fall foul of the Act, the prohibited interception must be 





Notwithstanding the general prohibition contained in section 2, section 6 of the Act contains 
a further exception to the prohibition which applies specifically to the workplace. This 
section allows an employer to intercept and monitor ‘indirect communications’ taking place 
via its telecommunications system if certain conditions listed in section 6(2) are met. As 
indicated above, an ‘indirect communication’ is a transfer of information that occurs over a 
telecommunication system (via technology) or via the postal service to another person.  
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1. The interception must be authorized by its ‘system controller’,  which is defined as a 
‘natural person’ in the case of a private body; any partner in a partnership; and the chief 
executive officer or person duly authorized by him or her in the case of a juristic person. 
2. The interception must be to establish facts, to detect unauthorised use of the 
telecommunication system or to secure the effective operation of the system. 
3. The communications must have been made via the electronic and telecommunications 
systems provided for use wholly or partly in connection with the employers business. 
4. The systems controller must make reasonable efforts to inform the employees using the 
system that indirect communications may be intercepted, or alternatively, the consent of 
the employees must be obtained either expressly or impliedly. 
 
Aside from RICA, there also exists the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act
203
  
which was enacted to remove barriers to the legal recognition of electronic transactions. The 
overall objective of this Act is to enable and facilitate electronic transactions and to create 
public confidence in electronic transacting.
204
 Section 86 of the Act purports to require an 
employer to obtain the authority and consent of employees before intercepting and 
monitoring their email and telephone communications and data stored on an employee’s 
computer.
205
 However section 6 of the RICA prevails because section 86 is expressly subject 
to the RICA.  The RICA requires consent or prior knowledge of the employees and moreover 
it does not require that notice be given immediately prior to the interception. Prior knowledge 
can be obtained through a standing written policy advising the employees of the company’s 
right to intercept and monitor when the need arises or in the case of company Email use, the 
checking of an appropriate box confirming knowledge of the new rule before any user may 
obtain further access to the computer system of the company. 
 
It is thus evident that RICA constitutes a statutory right of the employer to violate an 
employee’s right to privacy under certain conditions. Together with section 36 of the 
Constitution which will have to be applied in each situation. This is where the employees’ 
rights may be limited in terms of the employers common law right to protect its property and 
business interest, but the limitation must be reasonable and justifiable after considering the 
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employees right to dignity and privacy, the importance, purpose and extent of the limitation 






In the employment context the question that arises is whether an employer is entitled to 
intrude into the conversations of his or her employees that have nothing to do with the 
employers business, or even if they do, how far does such privilege extend. The general trend 
of thinking is that an employee’s telephone calls which impact on the business affairs of the 











Here the employer, Protea Technology had, without the consent of the employee (Wainer), 
recorded telephone calls made by Weiner in the workplace which was tendered in court to 
prove that Wainer was acting in breach of a restraint of trade agreement. The employee 
argued that the recordings invaded his right to privacy and contravened the Interception and 
Monitoring Prohibition Act and that the court no longer had discretion to admit the evidence. 
 
The court found that the right to privacy requires a subjective expectation of privacy which 
society recognises as objectively reasonable.
209
 In its enquiry the court considered the fact 
that the telephone calls were conducted from the employer’s premises within business hours 
and that conversations of the employee relating to the employers affairs were not private and 
were not protected under the Constitution.
210
 The court held that the employer had a 
contractual right to know where his employee may be committing a delictual action.  In 
concluding the court held that Wainer was not entitled to insist upon the protection of the 
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constitutional right to privacy and upheld the discretion of the court to admit illegally 








Here the right to privacy was interpreted and applied extensively.
213
 The issue in this case 
was whether the employer was entitled to use evidence at a disciplinary hearing, which it had 
obtained by intercepting and recording the employee’s telephone calls in his office on the 
employer’s premises, and which contributed to Moonsamy’s dismissal. The employee argued 
that the telephonic evidence was obtained illegally in violation of the Interception and 
Monitoring Prohibition Act and the Constitution and accordingly it should have not have 
been led at the hearing. 
 
The arbitrator held that the recording was an invasion of the employees’ rights in terms of 
section 14 (d) of the Constitution. 
214
 The second stage of the enquiry was to consider 
whether the infringement could be justified in accordance with the limitation clause in terms 




1. The nature of the right: The arbitrator considered American case law to the effect that a 
person is entitled to a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’. A reasonable expectation can 
only be said to exist when the individual has a subjective expectation of privacy and 
society, objectively, recognize the expectation as reasonable. The court held “in reality it 
is extremely difficult to clarify, at least with any degree of precision, the nature of the 
right to privacy of an employee on the premises of the employer during working 
hours”.
216
 The court stated that the present case went further than rummaging in an 
employee’s desk or filing cabinet.
217
 The court explained that it could be argued that if a 
telephone call related to the employers business, the employer was entitled to be privy to 
that conversation. But if the employer were allowed to make that initial decision 
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regarding the nature of the call, the right to privacy would be meaningless.
218
 The right 
would then amount to having a tribunal decide, after the interception of the call that the 
call did not relate to the business of the employer and so was confidential.
219
 
2. The importance of the purpose of the limitation: The court explained that the employee’s 
right to privacy regarding work related matters had to be qualified on the basis of the 
fiduciary relationship between employee and employer that entitled the employer to 
loyalty and honesty.
220
 In this case the employer contended its actions necessary for its 
self-preservation, however the court held that a person’s occupation was pivotal to his 
personal and professional life and that the rights to which a citizen was entitled in his 




3. The nature and extent of the limitation: The court held that whereas an employer might 
ask for and monitor the number of personal calls an employee makes, the disclosure ends 
there unless prior authorisation is sought or compelling reasons of business necessitates 
that the content be disclosed.
222
 
4. The relation between the limitation and its purpose: In this case the interception of the 
telephone call was intended to provide evidence against the employee. The court stated 
that the method chosen to obtain the evidence was excessively invasive and therefore 
only justifiable if the employer could show that the interception was the only way to 
secure essential evidence.
223




5. Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose: The point that was stressed here was that if 
an employer actually could have used other more conventional methods of obtaining 
incriminating evidence against the employee then it should have done so. If, however 
there were no alternatives to telephone tapping, then the employer should seek prior 
authorization. This could be obtained by way of either employee consent as a condition of 
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Internet and Email Monitoring: 
 
Today, Internet and Email is seen as a crucial business tool and has replaced the 
traditional modes of communication in the workplace such as letter, fax and telex. It has 
redefined the workplace and altered the face of communication in many respects.
226
 
Email has enabled instantaneous and inexpensive communications between individuals
227
 
and the Internet has brought with it access to virtually unlimited information and has 
moved beyond being a communications infrastructure to becoming a new software 
platform.
228
 Although, given the fact that Internet and Email has irreversibly changed the 
way the workplace is conducted and has brought with it ease of communication and 
unlimited information, it has also brought with it many liabilities, threats and legal risks 
for employers.
229
 In an effort to reduce Internet and Email misuse in the workplace, 
employers have found it necessary to regulate and monitor their use by employees, thus 
threatening employee privacy. Many companies have also established an Internet and 
Email usage policy informing employees of what is acceptable in terms of using these 
facilities. In an article by Mc Gregor, she identifies three problems encountered in the 
workplace with Internet and Email, firstly both the employer and the employee can be 
exposed to various form of liability where for example material subject to copyright is 
downloaded, or when an employee makes defamatory statements and where 
discriminating material is sent, secondly viruses can be contracted and transmitted by 
internal networks and lastly excessive use of the facilities which might result in a 
company’s mail server and Internet becoming congested because of the over loading of 
networks as well as unnecessary time being spent on personal business which in turn will 




These reasons advanced by employers to justify the monitoring of Internet and Email in 
the workplace relate mainly to economic reasons of ensuring an efficient and productive 
workplace. It seems that many employers have lost sight of the right to privacy of an 
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employee which also deserves special protection and recognition and that non-recognition 








In this case, Energizer, a manufacturing company of batteries, dismissed a group of its 
employees for violating the company’s email policy. The employees were charged with 
and dismissed for “the repeated violation of company’s policies and procedure regarding 
the use of company email and “the repeated receipt and forwarding to colleagues of 
obscene pornographic, racist and sexist material and jokes”.
232
 The applicants did not 
dispute sending or receiving the material. However they contended that there was no clear 
rule against the private use of email and that their right to privacy was invaded.  
 
In dealing with these arguments, the arbitrator noted that the company had issued several 
directives concerning the use of email, including one issued in response to a chain letter 
forwarded by one of the employees, While none of these dealt expressly with porn or 
racist material, they left no room for doubt that the circulation of such material was 
forbidden. The background of the employees, which the arbitrator described as 
“middleclass not bereft of education”, convinced the arbitrator that the applicants should 
have known that their conduct was unacceptable.
233
 The arbitrator also stated that even if 
the policy was silent on prohibitions against e-mail use in the workplace, common sense 
should have made the employees realise that the grotesqueness of the material they were 




Regarding the privacy claim, the arbitrator found that there was no violation as the 
material could not be described as personal in nature, the dignity or personal affairs of the 
employees had not been affected and lastly that the materials were stored on the 
employers computers and therefore could not be considered personal communications.
235
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This case is illustrative of the fact that even if the company has no explicit policy 
regulating email use in the workplace, employees cannot claim that they had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in respect of all communication received and forwarded in the 
workplace. 
 




In this case a manager was dismissed for circulating a cartoon he had received, which 
depicted the President of Zimbabwe as a gorilla via the company’s email. He was charged 
with distribution of racist/and or inflammatory material and violation of the company’s 
email policy.
237
 The employee argued that he did not regard the cartoon as racist and that 
he was aware of the company’s e-mail policy, but was not aware of the fact that the 
cartoon fell within the policy’s prohibitions. 
238
 On evaluation of the evidence the 
commissioner found that the cartoon was racist and inflammatory and that the employers 
Internet and Email code specifically prohibited the transmission of any offensive racial, 
sexual, religious or political images, documents and images on the company’s system.
239
 
Although the right to privacy was not the direct issue in this case, it provided some 









In this case an employee had been dismissed for sending a sexually explicit email to three 
colleagues on the company’s intranet. The employee admitted that what he had sent was 
inappropriate, contained sexually explicit material and he also was aware of the 
company’s electronic communications policy. He further stated that he had intended no 
harm and it was merely a joke. The commissioner in this case placed a lot of emphasis on 
the employee’s motive in sending out the Email and said that his intention was to 
embarrass and cause offence, especially after he had admitted that he had a hostile 
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relationship with his colleagues.
242
 The commissioner accordingly concluded that he was 









In this case the applicant was dismissed for forwarding porn material on the company’s 
email system. The commissioner found that the applicant had clearly accessed material to 
which he knew he was not allowed access, and to forwarding that material through the 
company’s email system.
245
 Although the applicant had forwarded the material to a select 









In this case an employee was charged with dishonesty in that she excessively misused the 
company computer for personal use during working hours and further she was charged 
with making defamatory remarks about her employer in an Email to a friend she sent 
from the company computer. The arbitrator found that the issue was whether, in the 
absence of a written policy against personal use of Internet, the employee could be 
reasonably be expected to know or be aware of the rule.
248
 In deciding on this issue the 
arbitrator “found that not all rules and policies have to be made known to employees as 
some common sense has to weighed against reasonableness”.
249
 As a result the employee 
“could reasonably have been expected to know the rules as she was cautioned at the start 
of her employment and due to her experience as an employee”.
250
 With regard to the 
defamatory charge, the employer argued that the manner in which the Email was obtained 
was not illegal in that the Email was obtained during an investigation into the employee’s 
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excessive Internet usage.  The arbitrator stated that the right to privacy contained in 
section 14(d) of the Constitution particularly, can be limited where consent has been 
given or a clear policy on monitoring and intercepting of communications in the 
workplace is implemented.
251
 The arbitrator found that the Email was not obtained with 
malicious intent but its discovery was incidental to the investigation into the employee’s 








The employer in this case found out that his employee had over a period of five months 
visited thousands of Internet sites, most of which contained pornographic material. The 
employer found out that the employee had spent approximately 285 hours per week 
visiting 14802 non-work related sites.
254
 The employee argued that his actions could not 
be considered unacceptable because he was aware of the company’s IT policy document, 
but did not read it because it was a bulky document. The commissioner found this 
argument to be unacceptable and also found that the employee knew of the policy because 
he ignored the popup messages that warned that the sites he was accessing were 
prohibited.
255
 Further the commissioner stated that even if the employee was unaware of 
the company’s policy, he should have made use of his common sense. The commissioner 






In concluding on this chapter of Interception and Monitoring of Communications in the 
workplace I think it is quite evident that South Africa is lacking in precedent regarding 
the issue of privacy in the workplace in terms of electronic communications. Most of the 
cases which I have discussed illustrate that courts are more accommodating of employers 
monitoring Internet and Email usage of employees.
257
 The main reason for this is because 
the employer owns the Internet and Email facilities in the workplace and hence it is 
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justified in protecting its business interests by regulating and monitoring the use of these 
facilities. While this may be the position, the right of an employee to privacy is often 
overlooked either because “the way in which the employer gathers information is does in 
circumstances which eliminate a reasonable expectation of privacy”, or the employers 
business interest constitutes a justifiable and acceptable limitation to the right to privacy 




With RICA having been adopted, it is indeed a better piece of legislation than the 
previous IMPA. It directly regulates the interception and monitoring of Internet and 
Email communications in both the public and private spheres as oppose to IMPA which 
was mainly intended for use by public agencies in gathering evidence during criminal 
investigations. An employer will have to follow the stringent procedures laid down for 
any interception and monitoring in the workplace otherwise such violation will lead to a 
fine or imprisonment. 
 
Although with the advent of RICA, it is evident that case law has not really dealt with the 
application of the Act and more importantly has not paid much attention to the balancing 
of the rights of an employer to monitor and intercept electronic communications versus an 
employee’s right to privacy. A vast majority of the cases have dealt with the issue of 
whether an employee’s dismissal was fair and merely have paid lip service to the right of 
privacy. In these cases as well, most of them have indicated that the employer’s business 
interests will trump those of the employee.
259
 “It is probably just a matter of time before 
the extent of an employee’s right to privacy is tested in the Constitutional Court, 
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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE IN CIVIL & 




Labour disputes arise from the relationship between employers and employees, or the 
termination thereof.
261
 Thus far in my dissertation I have examined a series of practices 
that an employer conducts in his or her workplace, in each of these practices the employer 
seeks some sort of evidence or ‘answer’ from an employee that ultimately leads to the 
employees dismissal. In the majority of cases the manner in which the employer acquires 
information about an employee is not sanctioned by law and the question which arises is 
whether the employer may use it against the employee in disciplinary and arbitration 
proceedings. How evidence is presented and its admissibility depends on whether the 
proceedings are internal disciplinary proceedings, statutory arbitrations conducted by the 
CCMA or relevant Bargaining Council in terms of section 138 of the Labour Relations 
Act, or Labour Court Proceedings. 
 
Onus of Proof: 
 
Section 192 of the Labour Relations Act places the onus of proving misconduct and the 
fairness of any dismissal on the employer. Where it is disputed, the onus rests on the 
employee to prove that a dismissal took place. 
 
Standard of Proof: 
 
In Labour matters the degree of proof required to discharge an onus is the balance of 
probabilities. To succeed the party who bears the onus of proof would have to show that 
its version is more likely to have happened than the version of the other party. If for 
example, an employee is accused of misconduct or the employer is accused of unfair 
dismissal, to discharge its onus, the employer does not need to show that the facts are 
inconsistent with any possible or even reasonable inference except that the employee 
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committed the specific misconduct in question, and in the latter case, that the dismissal 
was fair. 
 
The Shifting Evidentiary Burden: 
 
Although the overall onus never shifts, during the arbitration the need to counter evidence 
may rest on different parties. In a misconduct case, for example, once the employer has 
fleshed out its allegations in evidence to a degree that its version requires an answer or 
rebuttal, if it is to be believed, the evidentiary burden shifts onto the accused employee to 
prove otherwise. For example, video footage capturing an employee concealing 
merchandise on her person while working in a retail store constitutes a prima facie case of 
dishonesty against the employee and this then shifts the evidentiary burden to the 
employee. In the absence of a credible and probable explanation from the employee, the 
inference that could reasonably be drawn is that the employee had acted dishonestly and 




The Right to Remain Silent: 
 
Some disciplinary offences may be crimes as well. The employee faces a choice between 
possibly losing his case through failing to reply to accusations or disclosing evidence that 
may lead to his conviction. In this situation, an employee is not entitled to a stay of the 
disciplinary or arbitration proceedings until the completion of the criminal trial, nor is he 
immune from the evidentiary burden to rebut a case made against him on the basis of a 
right against self-incrimination and to remain silent. Section 35 of the Constitution is 
applicable to criminal proceedings, not labour proceedings.
263
 As a result, should an 
employee make incriminating statements during a labour case, he may apply in the 
criminal trial for the statements to be supressed on the grounds that its use in that forum 




Admissibility of Evidence in Arbitrations: 
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Admissibility refers to whether a particular item of evidence may be introduced at the 
hearing and/or be taken into account by the arbitrator. While arbitrators are required to 
observe the most basic of the rules of evidence, such as those relating to the onus and 
standard of proof, relevance and privileged information, section 138 directs them to deal 
with the admissibility of evidence with a minimum of legal formalities. Generally, if the 
evidence appears to be logically and legally relevant, arbitrators should admit it. There 
must be some advance indication that the evidence, if received, may assist the arbitrator 
in deciding the case. 
 
Interception of Communications: 
 
If an employer acquires information about an employee by means not sanctioned by the 
law, the question which arises is whether the employer may use it against the employee in 
civil and Labour Court proceedings. 
 
Admissibilty Criteria in Civil Proceedings: 
  
A civil litigant who wants to introduce improperly obtained evidence must explain why 
he did not follow lawful means to obtain the evidence. The court will have regard to the 
type of evidence which was improperly obtained. In the case of Fedics Group v 
Matus
264
the court held that a civil court has discretion to allow illegally and unlawfully 
obtained evidence.
265
 Further it was stated that evidence obtained through conscious and 





In the case of Lotter v Arlow and Another
267
 the court held that a tribunal in a civil case 
does have a discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence and in this regard the 
court should examine all relevant considerations, including (i) whether the evidence could 
have been obtained lawfully; (ii) whether justice could have been achieved by following 
ordinary procedures; and (iii) whether there was a deliberate violation of another’s 
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 The court accordingly concluded that to admit the relevant 
evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and invite a similar 
disregard of the constitutional rights of litigants by other creditors, encouraging disrespect 
for the law and the Constitution.
269
 As a matter of public policy and in upholding the 
constitutional rights of the respondents, the court had to act against the unwarranted 




However, arbitration and disciplinary proceedings are not civil court proceedings and 
section 138 of the Labour Relations Act provides that admissibility rules must not be 




The Industrial Court suggested that in labour matters the adjudicator has no discretion to 
exclude illegally or improperly obtained evidence.
271
 However in later decisions, the 
Labour Court refused to admit evidence that was obtained in contravention of the 
criminal legislation that regulates entrapment and held that the onus is on the employer to 
prove its conduct was fair.
272
  It is suggested that based on an employee’s constitutional 
right to fair labour practices, an arbitrator does have discretion to exclude illegally and 
improperly obtained evidence.  In this context fairness may be defined in terms of a 
balancing of the employee’s right to dignity and privacy and the employer’s right to 
protect its business and the rule that employer’s decisions should be substantively and 
procedurally fair where the rights of employees are concerned.
273
 Bases on this and the 
fact that section 6 already accommodates the balancing of rights and prejudice, the 
arbitrator, in determining whether to admit the evidence, should consider the following 
factors,: whether the evidence could have been obtained lawfully; whether the employer 
knowingly and deliberately contravened any law that regulates the gathering of the 
evidence, such as RICA; whether there was a pre-existing suspicion that the employee 
was committing misconduct  and whether there were reasonable grounds for believing 
                                                          
268
 Ibid, para 64. 
269
 Note 267 above, para 65. 
270
 Note 267 above, para 65. 
271
 Goosen v Caroline Frozen Yoghurt Parlour (Pty) Ltd and Another (1995) 16 396 (IC). 
272
 Cape Town City Council v SAMWU and Others (2000) 21 ILJ 2409 (LC). 
273
 The fact that section 6 of RICA permits interception only under certain conditions indicates that employees 
do have rights in these situations. 
70 
 





In Moonsamy v The Mailhouse,
275
 the arbitrator stated that telephone conversations are a 
“very private affair” and that the employer must show that there are compelling reasons 
within the context of business necessity that the contents of those conversations are 
disclosed.
276
 He drew the line at continual tapping of an employee’s business telephone 
and found that the employer could have and had in fact acquired evidence against 




In Sugreen v Standard Bank of SA,
278
 the employer had obtained a tape recording of a 
conversation between one of its managers and a service provider which revealed a bribe. 
The tape recording was made and given to the employer by the service provider. Here the 
arbitrator distinguished Moonsamy on the basis that there were few other methods by 
which the evidence could have been acquired. That the recording was made during 
business hours, using the employers telephone, and that, in any event, it was a case of 




Protea Technology Ltd and Another v Wainer and Others
280
pointed out that an employee 
may receive and make calls which have nothing to do with his employers business. The 
employee making such calls has a legitimate expectation of privacy and the employer 
cannot compel him to disclose the substance of those calls.
281
 The employer may however 




In the case of Bramford & Others v Energiser (SA) Limited
283
 the arbitrator sanctioned 
the collection and storage of Email messages from employee’s private mailboxes on the 
basis that the content of the messages (crude jokes and pornographic material) could not 
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be construed as private.  Moreover, when the company conducted an audit of its system 
when technical problems arose through overloading, it was seeking to establish the 
existence of facts (the root of the technical problem) to secure the systems effective 





Other monitoring and searches: 
 
An employer is entitled to monitor its premises and the conduct of employees in 
operational areas (excluding change-rooms and toilets) through video and other camera 
surveillance to protect its business and property. Evidence obtained in these 
circumstances is admissible as there is no legitimate expectation of absolute privacy in 
these areas. Evidence obtained from searches of an employee’s workstation or body 
searches is admissible if the employer had good reason to suspect an offence and, in the 
case of a body search, the employee has contractually agreed to such searches and the 





In concluding on this chapter it is clear that evidence obtained by an employer by means 
not sanctioned by law will not be readily admitted by the courts. An employer will have 
to provide reasons as to why he or she could not follow the proper procedures laid down 
for the collection of the specific evidence in question. One of the courts function is to 
prevent an abuse of the process through improper or unlawful practices by disallowing 
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My dissertation set out to examine the extent to which privacy is protected in the workplace 
given the many advancements in technology coupled with the practices adopted by the 
employer to monitor employees. I indicted at the outset (chapter one) that privacy is a 
fundamental right in the Constitution, however such right is not absolute and can be limited 
where it is reasonable and justifiable to do in terms of section 36 known as the limitation 
clause. I also explained that the right to privacy in the workplace is something which 
employee’s value and is essential for their personal development and growth. At the same 
time however it was apparent that employers have a considerable interest in their business 
and property and hence will be seen to infringe the privacy rights of employees. This is where 
the ultimate balancing act is put to the test, between the employees right to privacy on the one 
hand and on the other hand the right of the employer to conduct his or her business according 
to his or her managerial prerogative.  
 
Chapter two traced the development of the legal protection of privacy in both South Africa 
and the United States of America. My reason for choosing these two countries as indicated 
was because each one represents a different and distinct approach to privacy protection. 
South Africa provides for and lists privacy as a fundamental right in its Constitution whereas 
the United States of America does not provide for a distinct right to privacy, instead it is 
inferred from and given meaning from other rights. This was an important chapter as it 
indicated how in both countries how the protection grew from a common law position to 
ultimately constitutional status. South Africa initially regarded privacy as one of the 
personality rights until it was recognised as a specific distinct right. Importantly ii is 
“submitted that the United States of America should be commended for not only recognising 
but also protecting the right to privacy despite the absence of the right in its Constitution to 
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In chapter three I examined the practice of polygraph testing and how it infringes on the right 
to privacy. I indicated that polygraph tests certainly do infringe the privacy rights of 
employees by compelling them to communicate those personal facts and emotions which 
there have chosen to exclude from the knowledge of outsiders. With this form of testing, 
employees are always, the disadvantaged party in an unfair position almost being dominated 
by a machine that is able to make certain assumptions which are not necessarily correct. I 
also stated that the polygraph tests cannot detect deceit or lies and neither is there any 
scientific research that proves a polygraph to be 100 percent reliable. This is also the reason 
why our courts have treated the admissibility of such evidence so inconsistently. 
Unfortunately though is the reality that polygraph tests are here to stay and are gaining more 
popularity. Perhaps if legislation were enacted to regulate this practice the negative aspects 
would be diminished. 
Chapter four was an analysis of HIV/Aids testing in the workplace and its effects on the right 
to privacy. I explained that the HIV/Aids pandemic is certainly a serious one with far 
reaching consequences. One of the biggest effects is in the workplace where productivity is 
hampered with the loss of employees and as a result of this damaging effect employers have 
resorted to testing current as well as future employees. This testing invades the privacy of 
employees who choose to keep the nature of their status, be it negative or positive to 
themselves. Employees with the virus may very well be productive for many years and as 
such the nature of their ‘status’ may be nothing more than a ‘status’. Notwithstanding this, in 
certain industries a negative HIV status is an inherent requirement of the job and as a result 
testing is compulsory, in this situation then informed consent is crucial and if the applicant is 
not awarded the job he or she must fully understand why. 
In chapter five I provided an analysis of body and workstation searches as well as monitoring 
through video surveillance. The general rule is that an employer may not conduct body and 
workstation searches without an employee’s consent or unless the employer has a good 
reason to suspect that the employee is committing an offence. Video surveillance is also 
commonly used in many companies and the effects are largely that an employee is made to 
feel constantly under the watch which hampers work productivity and confidence to a certain 
extent. 
In chapter 6 I provided an overview of interception and monitoring in the workplace with 
particular reference to RICA. This type of monitoring in the workplace has become a new 
74 
 
trend in almost every workplace and has enabled employers to monitor their employees more 
effectively through enhanced technological equipment. The chapter also revealed that the 
main reasons advanced by employers to monitor Internet and Email usage of employees is 
that they have a direct interest in the Internet and Email facilities being the owners of it and 
secondly in ensuring that the workplace is productive and efficient. On the other hand the 
arguments adopted by employees relate to their right to informational privacy and not to be 
policed in the workplace. Especially today where the line between workplace and personal 
activity has become very blur. In this chapter it was also clear that after the adoption of 
RICA, not much has been said about the right to privacy, instead in the majority of cases the 
right of the employer’s business interests has been given priority. 
In chapter seven I answered the question of whether the evidence obtained by the employer in 
all these practices will be admissible. This chapter highlighted that the courts will not readily 
admit such evidence without proper reasons as to why it could not be obtained lawfully. I 
also indicated the difference between civil and labour court proceedings when it comes to the 
admissibility of evidence. 
To conclude, the protection of privacy in the workplace is certainly not something which a 
high premium is placed on. My dissertation set out to examine how privacy is infringed in 
light of the various practices adopted by the employer and it was quite evident how in each 
practice the infringement was undoubtedly clear. The value and importance of the right to 
privacy cannot be underestimated as it is indeed an important right and necessary for all 
human being in order to flourish and develop. Unfortunately it is not given the proper value 
in a workplace environment, where in almost every case the employers operational concerns 
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